Will the Spurs Win in 2009?

When we look at past data – specifically past patterns in data — we often hope to glean insights into the future.  For example, consider the following past pattern: The San Antonio Spurs won the NBA championship in 2003, 2005, and 2007.  One doesn’t need to be a college professor to see what this pattern suggests about the future.  Obviously the Spurs are destined to win the NBA title in 2009.  In fact, we might as well skip the next season and get to the 2009-10 season. 

And with that observation, my post on the Spurs should end.  The data says clearly San Antonio is going to win in 2009.  So what more needs to be said?

Of course, there is a tiny possibility that more could be said about this team.  Specifically, we could look at the productivity of the individual players and see if we can figure out why the Spurs declined in 2007-08 (other than just the fate of the San Antonio Spurs). And maybe we can even toss out a few thoughts on what this team is doing to win a title (other than just counting on past patterns to perfectly predict the future).

The Championship Spurs

The story of the Spurs decline begins with what happened in 2006-07. Two years ago the Spurs posted an efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) of 9.1.  That mark led the NBA in 2006-07, and was also the best differential in team history.

Such a differential translated into a 63.5 Wins Produced for the team, which also led the NBA (not surprising since Wins Produced is based on efficiency differential). When we move from the team’s Wins Produced to the individual players – as we do in Table One (re-printed from 2007) — we see which players were the primary producers of wins for this team two seasons ago.

Table One: The San Antonio Spurs in 2005-06 and 2006-07

Of the team’s 63.5 Wins Produced, Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, Tony Parker, and Brent Barry produced 51.9 (or 82%).  Or to put it another way, everyone else on the Spurs produced fewer than 12 wins.   So the productivity of the aforementioned quartet appears to be the driving force behind the team’s success.

The Spurs Decline

When we look at 2007-08, we see that the Spurs efficiency differential was only 5.25.  As a consequence, the team’s Wins Produced fell to 53.6, or nearly 10 wins off the production the team offered in 2006-07.  So although the team only won two fewer games last season (relative to the prior year), the Spurs were actually substantially worse. 

Why did this team decline?  Again, we turn to the performance of individual players. 

Table Two: The San Antonio Spurs in 2007-08

As Table Two reveals, the combination of Duncan, Ginobili, Parker, and Barry only produced 43.7 wins last year.  Much of this decline is not about players performing worse, but rather about players playing less.  Specifically, it is about one particular player playing less.  And that one particular player is Brent Barry.

To see this point, let’s look at the following numbers from Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker.

Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker in 2006-07: 44.4 Wins Produced

Duncan Ginobili, and Parker in 2007-08: 41.2 Wins Produced

Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker [2007-08 minutes, 2006-07 WP48]: 42.6 Wins Produced.

Now let’s look at Barry.  In 2006-07 he produced 7.5 wins.  Last season, in 1,077 fewer minutes – but with a very similar WP48 [Wins Produced per 48 minutes] — he only produced 2.5 wins.  In other words, about 50% of the team’s decline in Wins Produced can be tied to Barry playing less.

Back in March I posted The Better Barry.  This column noted that Brent Barry

- has produced nearly 100 wins in his career

- is easily the best Barry brother (topping Jon and Drew)

- is a more productive player than his hall-of-fame father (Rick)

Obviously this column highlighted the importance of Barry to San Antonio’s success.  And I think it is Barry’s decline in minutes played – due to injury and trade – that played the biggest role in San Antonio’s decline.

The Spurs in 2008-09

Unfortunately for the Spurs 2009 title hopes, the Better Barry is going to be playing in Houston in 2008-09.   This means the Spurs are going to need to find someone else to supplement the production of Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker.

Although I think there is hope in the front-court, I want to focus first on what the Spurs have done in the back-court.  Specifically I want to comment briefly on the re-signing of Michael Finley and the acquisition of Roger Mason. 

Let’s start with Finley.  When we look at Finley’s career per-minute performance – specifically his WP48 – we see a player who is basically average.  An average player posts a WP48 of 0.100.  Finley’s career mark is 0.097. And this career matches the expected trajectory.  He was below average his first two season.  In six of the next seven seasons his WP48 surpassed the 0.100 mark (with a high of 0.145 in 1998-99).  And then for his last four seasons, as he has gotten old, he has been below average.

Table Three: Michael Finley, Career and Last Season

Looking at the individual stats – in Table Three — we can see what Finley does well and where he has declined. For his career he is an above average scorer (in terms of both efficiency and totals), who limits his turnovers and personal fouls. Finley has also been able to get assists across his entire career.  When we look at last season, though, we see that Finley has morphed into little more than a scorer.  His rebounds, steals, blocked shots, and assists have all declined relative to his career averages.  As a consequence, his Win Score – relative to both an average shooting guard and average small forward – is below par.  So it doesn’t look like Finley is going to make much difference in the San Antonio’s drive to another title.

What about Mason? Like Finley, Mason is also above average with respect to shooting efficiency.

Table Four: Roger Mason, Career and Last Season

But Mason doesn’t do much else.  Whether you call him a point guard or shooting guard, he is below average with respect to rebounds, steals, assists, and personal fouls.  And like Finley, Mason doesn’t get to the line much either.  So it seems unlikely that Finley or Mason can make up for the loss of Barry. 

If we shift our focus off the back-court, though, we can find some reason for optimism.  Fabricio Oberto’s 0.184 WP48 last season suggests that he is a capable fourth member of the Spurs leading quartet.  In fact, I think the Spurs could win between 55 and 60 games next year (assuming no major injuries to Duncan, Ginobili, Parker, and Oberto).  Such a mark isn’t quite as good as the Wins Produced we saw in 2006-07.  And it probably isn’t good enough to catch the Utah Jazz (who were quite good last year), the New Orleans Hornets (who I think will be even better next year), or the LA Lakers (who I still think are the favorites to win it all in 2009).

But the Spurs are good enough to give their fans hope.  And fans of this team should enjoy this sense of hope while they can.  Again, the key players are Duncan, Ginobili, Parker, and now Oberto.  Although Parker is only 26, the other three members of the quartet are now on the wrong side of 30.  As we saw with Finley, age tends to lead to less production.  With less production, San Antonio will eventually start to lose more frequently.  And no amount of coaching or team attitude (something people often credit for the Spurs success) is going to change this fact.

- DJ

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Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.

The Technical Notes at wagesofwins.com provides substantially more information on the published research behind Wins Produced and Win Score

Wins Produced, Win Score, and PAWSmin are also discussed in the following posts:

Simple Models of Player Performance

Wins Produced vs. Win Score

What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say

Introducing PAWSmin — and a Defense of Box Score Statistics

Finally, A Guide to Evaluating Models contains useful hints on how to interpret and evaluate statistical models.