Mark Cuban became the majority owner of the Dallas Mavericks towards the end of the 1999-00 season (the deal was approved by the NBA on April 11, 2000). The team Cuban purchased was just finishing its 20th season in the Association. In those 20 years the Mavericks had won 40% of its regular season games. In only six seasons did the Mavericks win more than half its games, and the 50 win barrier was only surpassed twice. In sum, the Mavericks were historically a bad team.
With Cuban in charge, though, the Mavericks have been outstanding. Across the past seven seasons the Mavericks have won at least 52 games every time, with an average record of 58.1 victories per season. Only the San Antonio Spurs have done better (59.0 average). So what’s been the key (or keys) to this team’s success?
The Dallas Star
When looking at a team you have to start with the “star” or the most productive player. And on the Mavericks, the star is Dirk Nowitzki. Nowitzki was drafted by Milwaukee in 1998, but then traded that night to Dallas (for Robert Traylor). So he was in Dallas before Cuban bought the team. In fact, he’s the only player who has been with the Mavericks since Cuban took over.
Before Cuban arrived, Nowitzki didn’t do very much. Across his first two seasons in the league he only produced 4.6 victories (in fact, after two years Traylor had a higher WP48). But beginning with the 2000-01 campaign, Nowitzki has been very good. Across the past seven seasons Nowitzki has produced 114 wins and posted a WP48 (Wins Produced per 48 minutes) of 0.261. Given that the team has won 407 games, 28% of the Mavericks regular seasons success can be linked to its star player (and for those interested, Traylor finished his career with exactly 10 Wins Produced).
The Supporting Cast
Having one great player is important, but it takes more than that to be successful. You also have to employ a great supporting cast. In the discussion of the Pareto Principle I reported for each team in 2006-07 two sets of Wins Produced numbers. First I noted the Wins Produced from the top three players on each roster. And then I noted the Wins Produced from the non-top three players (or the supporting cast).
Last year the Houston Rockets had the best supporting cast, with the non-top three producing 26.7 wins. In contrast, the non-top three in New Jersey only offered -0.7 wins. So the range in non-top three production is quite large.
Although in general we see a fair amount of variation in supporting cast production, that’s not the story when we look at the Mavericks in the Cuban Era (2000-01 to 2006-07). From Table One we can see that the non-top three in Dallas have been consistently good.
Table One: The Mavericks in the Cuban Era
In low point for the non-top three was Cuban’s first year, when the supporting cast in Dallas produced 17.5 wins. The best year was 2005-06, when the non-top three offered 23.7 victories. Comparing these results to what we saw in 2006-07 for all teams, the Mavericks’ worst supporting cast – seen in 2000-01 – would have been the 6th best non-top three in the Association last year.
Let’s give some more perspective on the quality of the supporting cast in Dallas. The Phoenix Suns had the second best record in the NBA last year. But only 8.5 victories in Phoenix could be tied to its supporting cast. Almost everything the Sun did last season was linked to the play of Steve Nash, Shawn Marion, and Amare Stoudemire.
If we consider the best team of all-time – the 1995-96 Chicago Bulls – we again see that it was the top-three that led the way. Only 15.4 victories on that team could be tied to its supporting cast (the rest were produced by Michael Jordan, Dennis Rodman, and Scottie Pippen).
In sum, top teams don’t always have great supporting cast. But in Dallas, a great supporting cast has been the one constant. Cuban, and of course his management team, have consistently assembled a large collection of above average performers. And the names in this collection have not been constant. No, despite significant roster turnover (remember, Nowitzski is the only player to stay with the team throughout the Cuban era), the Mavericks consistently employ a number of players who clear the average WP48 mark (average is 0.100).
The Past Two Years
This collection appears to have peaked across the past two seasons. In 2006 the Mavericks came quite close to winning the NBA title. And then last year, the Mavericks finished the regular season with 67 victories. Although this mark was the best in the league, the first round of the playoffs went quite badly. After six first round games against the Golden State Warriors, the Mavericks season was over.
Although the playoffs didn’t work out as planned, the 2006-07 regular season was quite successful. In fact, it was the second most successful regular season in team history.
Okay, wait a minute. They won 67 games and that’s the most in team history. So wasn’t last year the best Mavericks team in the history of this franchise?
In reviewing the Phoenix Suns last Saturday I noted the practice of evaluating teams by looking at efficiency differential [or offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency (or points per possession minus points surrendered per possession)]. The Mavericks in 2006-07 posted a differential of 7.8. This was quite good, but it was actually bested in team history by the 2002-03 squad (which had a 8.2 differential). It was also bested by the San Antonio Spurs in 2006-07. So the Mavericks last year were not “the best” team in franchise history or the Association.
Still, they were quite good and actually a bit better than the team that reached the Finals in 2006. When we compare the rosters in 2005-06 and 2006-07, we see that the changes to the team – or the players added and lost – were not why the Mavericks took a small step forward in 2006-07 (and I would emphasize “small step”).
Table Two: The Dallas Mavericks in 2005-06 and 2006-07
The players the Mavericks added to the roster last year combined to produce -0.1 wins, with no player offering more than 0.9 Wins Produced. In contrast, the players removed from the roster had produced 10.5 wins in 2005-06. Dallas was able to overcome this loss because every player who returned (except for DJ Mbenga who only played 79 minutes last year) played better in 2006-07.
Going Forward
In all, the 2006-07 team employed six above average performer in the regular rotation, with three players (Nowitzki, Josh Howard, and Erick Dampier) clearing the 0.200 mark.
This next season will start without Dampier, who is currently hurt. The Mavericks, though, have added Eddie Jones to the mix. E.Jones, as I noted last season (in this table), has been consistently above average throughout his career. Additionally the team added Trenton Hassell. Hassell is below average, but an upgrade over Greg Buckner.
In sum, if the improvements we saw last year remains, it’s possible the Mavericks will be a bit better this next season. And if that happens, Cuban’s team will contend for the eight consecutive season.
So will the Mavericks finally win a title? In a few days I will post my forecast where I will manage to say much in general but little that is specific (in other words, I will talk like an economist).
In the meantime, let’s ask this question: Does Cuban get credit for the recent success of this team? Well, that’s hard to say. There are a host of coaches and players who deserve quite a bit of credit. And I would also note the impact of Wayne Winston. Since The Wages of Wins came out I have gotten to know Winston (creator of the adjusted plus-minus system and University of Indiana profess0r), who works with the Mavericks. Maybe the team’s success is not due to Cuban, but rather Cuban’s former college professor. In fact, I like that story. Professors should get more credit for their student’s success (and of course, none of the blame for their failures).
– DJ
For a discussion of other teams see NBA Team Reviews: 2006-07
Our research on the NBA was summarized HERE.
The equation connecting wins to offensive/defensive efficiency is given HERE
Wins Produced and Win Score are discussed in the following posts
Simple Models of Player Performance
What Wins Produced Says and What It Does Not Say
Wages of Wins Journal 
MT Head
October 18, 2007
I believe Nowitski was not drafted by Dallas, but was obtained in a trade for “Tractor” Traylor. which, if my memory is correct, may rival Broglio for Brock historically.
Paulo
October 18, 2007
Great post. Not to mention timely, since there have been rumors lately for a Kobe-Dirk swap (straight-up?). I tried it on the ESPN Trade Machine and the finances work. Your thoughts? Personally, if Kobe does get traded to Dallas, I think it’s not for Nowitzki only.
dberri
October 18, 2007
MT,
You are right. He was not drafted by Dallas (which is what I originally said) but acquired on draft night in a trade (at least, I think it was on draft night). As I note now in the column, after two years it was not clear the Nowitzki trade made sense. Of course, now it is pretty obvious that Milwaukee wishes it had not made this trade.
Paulo,
Nowitzki for Kobe straight up is a bad trade for Dallas. Overall,Nowitzki produces more wins. But that isn’t the big problem. The Mavs already have a very productive guard in Jason Terry, so Kobe doesn’t improve the team that much at that position. And the Mavs don’t have any other productive power forwards. So at the 4 spot the team would have serious problems.
don
October 18, 2007
As much as I detest the Bucks’ front office, the Notwitski/Traylor “deal” was not as clear cut as you seem to be implying. I can’t remember the details but it was never a matter that Notwitski was going to play for the Bucks and Traylor was their compensation.
Also, ” Indiana University” and not “University of Indiana” was Cuban’s Alma Mater and the home of the Sampson Telephone Company.
Chris
October 18, 2007
It also looks like the mavs have been very well coached. They have very few players who get significant playing time (>1000 min) with below average WP48’s, and only one player (Stackhouse 05-06) with a negative WP48 over significant amount of PT.
Ryan Schwan
October 18, 2007
I remember when he took over the Mavericks – Nowitzki had just saved my fantasy team so I was watching their team – there were a slew of reports of the kinds of culture changes he instituted in the team.
If I remember right, he increased the staff, upgraded the training facility and locker room, and basically seemed to shake up a previously ignored and cheap organization.
Despite his love of the spotlight and penchant for being more of a fan than an owner at times, he deserves more than a little credit for changing the culture of that team.
Jason
October 18, 2007
The Traylor/Nowitzki trade was apparently something worked out ahead of time, though it still indicates that Dallas pulled off a swindle. Milwaukee wanted Traylor but was afraid he wouldn’t last until #9. They worked out a deal with Nelson and the Mavs where the Mavs would draft and trade Traylor’s rights and in exchange, the Bucks would take whomever Dallas told them too.
So Nowitzki was never really the property of the Bucks. Had the deal not gone down, Dallas was ready to take Nowitzki at #6 but they got a chance to extort a bit more out of the Bucks, figuring that it was unlikely enough that Philly or Sac would reach for the young, still mostly unknown Dirk. Dallas also got a #19 pick out of it that they used for Pat Garrity, whom they traded as part of a package for Nash.
Milwaukee was never going to get Dirk. If they didn’t deal for Traylor, Dallas was just going to take Dirk. Of course, it *still* means that they valued Traylor enough to trade up for him and gave up the #19 pick for a player who could well have been there at #9 and certainly wasn’t worth trading up for.
That was a crafty Nelson draft. It was also the year that Golden State took Vince Carter to trade him for Jamison with cash going to Toronto in the deal as well. Apparently, Nelson made it known that he really wanted Jamison (don’t know if that’s true, but that’s what leaked) and was going to trade from #6 to #4 to take him. The Warriors also wanted Jamison but were sitting at #5. Toronto apparently played this to their advantage, telling GS that they could have Jamison if they drafted Carter at #5 and swapped him with the cash. Toronto wanted Carter all along and would have drafted him #4. But the Warriors panicked and sent cash north of the border for the rights to have Jamison drafted a slot ahead of where GS drafted, thus costing them a half million $ for the rights to pay the #4 pick a bit more than the same player they could have picked at #5, especially bad when Carter proved to be the better player. So though Carter’s rights briefly belonged to GS it was only after the deal had been agreed to where he’d never play there. They really never had the chance to have Carter play in Oakland.
Of course, it could, and did get worse for the Warriors. A year later they traded their #10 pick (who would become Jason Terry) for an aged, uninspired Mookie Blaylock. In the same draft, they also managed to pick Jeff Foster only to send him immediately away for Vonteego Cummings and a future pick. Mookie was worthless. Cummings was worthless. Terry and Foster were not.
Paulo
October 19, 2007
Dave, I agree that a straight up Kobe-Dirk trade (for the sake of trading) would not be beneficial for both teams. I don’t think that this deal will push through simply because LA might not want any package that doesn’t include Dirk (something that Dallas might not do).
I tried playing around with the <a href= “http://games.espn.go.com/nba/features/traderesult?players=110~2421~2382~2006~841&teams=6~6~13~13~13&te=&cash=”ESPN Trade Machine and I got this to work financially (note: I don’t know if Dallas can include draft picks but they definitely have to include some). But I don’t think it’s enough for the NBA’s premiere scorer in LA’s mind, but if LA does push through with a trade, and Dallas is one of the teams that Kobe accepts a trade to, that might be a good start.
Paulo
October 19, 2007
sorry for the bad formatting :(
here’s the link again