The story of the Houston Rockets across much of the past ten years has been one of high hopes dashed by injury. Much of this tragedy has focused on Yao Ming, who entered the league in 2002 as the number one draft pick but has subsequently played fewer than 60 games in five of his nine NBA seasons (including only five games across the past two years). Although injuries have hit Ming hard, he is not the only Rocket star to spend significant time just watching basketball in Houston. Tracy McGrady came to Houston in 2004 and across the next five NBA seasons missed more than 100 regular season games.
The injuries to Ming and McGrady might leave fans of the Rockets thinking their team is cursed. Certainly one wouldn’t think that this team could be described as “injury-resistant”. But this is exactly the argument I am going to try to make.
The Pareto Principle Again
The story I am going to tell doesn’t begin in Houston, but a bit further to the East.
Okay, more than a big further. The big story in the NBA is in Miami. And when we look at this team, we see that the Super Friends — LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh – have combined to produce 27.9 wins so far this year (prior to Thursday night and according to the automated Wins Produced numbers from Andres Alvarez). This total is 75.6% of the Heat’s 36.5 Wins Produced.
Although much attention is paid to the Super Friends, a similar story can be seen with respect to the Boston Celtics and LA Lakers. The Lakers are led by Lamar Odom, Pau Gasol, and Kobe Bryant. This trio has combined to produce 28.0 wins, or 78.9% of the team’s total. And the Celtics trio of Rajon Rondo, Kevin Garnett, and Paul Pierce has combined to produce 25.8 wins, or 73.3% of the team’s Wins Produced.
The dominance of a team’s top three players is not unique to these three teams in 2010-11. From 1977-78 to 2009-10, the top three producers of wins on each team has produced – on average – 76% of their respective team’s total Wins Produced. This pattern illustrates the Pareto Principle, which states that 80% of outcomes can be linked to 20% of people. Although it’s not clear (at least to me) how much this simple rule – originally noted by the famed economist Vilfredo Pareto – applies in the general economy; as noted in the past, it does appear that the Pareto Principle works in the NBA.
Houston History
To further illustrate this story, let’s return to the subject of the Houston Rockets. The Rockets won two NBA titles in 1994 and 1995. But in 1996, the Chicago Bulls – led by Michael Jordan, Dennis Rodman, and Scottie Pippen – won 72 regular season games and the NBA title. This trio combined for 57.5 Wins Produced, or 78.5% of the team’s total.
As if to specifically counter the dominance of the Chicago Bulls, the Rockets added Charles Barkley in 1996. Sir Charles joined a team that already had Hakeem Olajuwon and Clyde Drexler. In 1995-96, this trio missed nearly 40 games. But had they each played an entire 82 game season, this trio would have posted the following numbers in 1995-96:
- Charles Barkley: 21.7 Wins Produced
- Clyde Drexler: 18.2 Wins Produced
- Hakeem Olajuwon: 16.9 Wins Produced
Altogether, this trio would have produced – if healthy for the entire 1995-96 season – 56.9 wins; a mark quite close to what the Bulls leading trio produced that season.
So hopes were quite high for the Rockets in 1996-97. Unfortunately, although Olajuwon only missed four games, Hakeem’s productivity declined (he was 34 years of age). And Barkley and Drexler missed 49 games. The Rockets still advanced to the Western Conference Finals, but lost in six games to the Utah Jazz (one of the better teams to never win an NBA title).
The idea that a magical trio, though, could lead a team to the promise land persisted in Houston. When Drexler retired after the 1997-98 season, Scottie Pippen was brought in to complete the trio. In the lock-out shortened season of 1999 this trio did combine to produce 92.8% of the team’s Wins Produced. But after a first round loss to the LA Lakers, and the continued aging of the Rockets’ top trio, this team began to take a different direction.
Before we get to that direction, let’s review the history of the Rockets before this past decade. The following table reports the top trio in Wins Produced for the Rockets from 1977-78 to 1998-99.
The key number is the percentage of wins produced by the top trio. From 1977-78 to 1998-99, the percentage of wins produced by Houston’s top trio averaged 83% and only fell below 70% once (in 1994-95). Before moving on, I also want to note that the top trio on each of these teams averaged 34.4 Wins Produced, while Houston’s teams across these 22 seasons averaged 42.4 Wins Produced. In other words, everyone else on the team only averaged 8.1 Wins Produced.
The Rockets Today
Again, the dominance of a team’s top trio is not unique to the Rockets from 1977-78 to 1998-99. This is often how teams are structured in the NBA. But after the 1998-99 season — as the following table illustrates — Houston began to build their team’s differently.
Across these eleven seasons, the percentage of wins produced by the top three players on the team has never exceeded 66.8%, and the average has been 56.5%. The top trio has also only produced an average of 25.1 wins per season. But the players not in the top trio are producing 19.6 wins per season. Consequently, although the Rockets “stars” can’t match what we saw before 1999-00, the teams in Houston are actually a bit better.
And this story continues this year. The following table reports the Wins Produced we see from the players on the Rockets after 51 games in 2010-11.
The Rockets are currently led by Kevin Martin, Shane Battier, and Kyle Lowry. This trio has produced 14.1 wins this season, or 54.8% of the team’s total. If this trio was what we had typically seen in the NBA – where a team’s top trio produces 76% of a team’s wins – then the Rockets would currently have about 18 Wins Produced. And that would put them on pace for about 30 wins this year. Just as we have seen across the past decade, though, the Rockets are much more than their top three players.
When we look past the top trio we see five players – Chuck Hayes, Luis Scola, Chase Budinger, Brad Miller, and Patrick Patterson – who are above average (or very close) and who have played more than 300 minutes. These five players have already produced 11.3 wins. And because the Rockets have these five players, the team’s efficiency differential (offensive efficiency minus defensive efficiency) is 0.1. No, that isn’t very impressive. But it is consistent with a 0.500 team, which is better than a team that wins only about 30 games.
Now let’s return to the subject of injuries. Imagine the Heat lose LeBron and/or Wade (which almost happened on Thursday night). Or the Lakers lose Kobe and/or Gasol. Or the Celtics lose Garnett and/or Pierce. What do we expect to happen? Because these teams rely so much on their top players – as team’s throughout NBA history have generally done – an injury to one or two top players can dramatically change a team’s fortunes.
Across the past decade, though, the Rockets have relied less on their top players. So when these player get hurt – as has often happened – the Rockets haven’t collapsed. In other words, the Rockets are “injury-resistant”.
Of course that doesn’t mean that injuries don’t hurt (pun intended). Houston would be better off this year with a healthy Yao Ming. But Houston seems to be constructed so that impact of losing a top player is less than what we would see on other teams.
Let me close by noting that this Daryl Morey has been responsible for building the Rockets since 2007. And since 2007, the team’s reliance on the top trio has declined. The trend we are observing, though, pre-dates Morey’s arrival. So this may not be about the current decision-makers in Houston. But whoever is responsible, how Houston is currently building its team, does seem different from what we have seen in the past. And the practice of defying Pareto, does appear to yield some benefits.
– DJ
Wages of Wins Journal 
kevin
February 4, 2011
So, based on this analysis, I think we need to revise the Pareto Prinbciple to state that “75% 0f outcomes can be linked to 25% of people. “
Man of Steele
February 4, 2011
Since there’s always room for improvement, I’ll give a bit of critique. Houston could maintain their depth (10 deep with at least moderately useful players) and still add a star player or players that would make their numbers look more pareto-friendly. Aaron Brooks and Yao Ming both receive “star” salaries and produce nothing (Yao due to injury, Brooks due to inefficiency).
Unfortunately, Houston has built there team around injury-prone players. Trading McGrady for Kevin Martin was hardly a step in the right direction as far as fragility is concerned. A fan can only hope that they let Yao walk this offseason.
Blake
February 4, 2011
Aaron Brooks doesn’t receive a star salary; he only makes $2 million.
Tracy McGrady was not traded for Kevin Martin. McGrady was traded for Jordan Hill, a first round pick, and the right to swap first round picks with New York.
Carl Landry was traded for Kevin Martin. You could still call it a step in the wrong direction, considering Landry’s production in Houston.
Brian
February 4, 2011
Yao Ming’s “last” name is Yao, not Ming.
Italian Stallion
February 4, 2011
Even though extra depth is always a positive, it’s difficult to squeeze enough wins together without stars. There are limited minutes and you have to have some stars producing during them.
tgt
February 4, 2011
I don’t agree with the contention that the Rockets weren’t built around stars in the 7 years before Morey came on board. It was just that Steve Francis was a horrible star, then Yao and McGrady were often hurt. If we projected those two for 75 games each year, would the percentages of wins earned by top players be the same?
It seems to me that it is around Morey’s time that they’ve been moving more toward depth and less toward stars.
Italian Stallion
February 4, 2011
All I think Morey is trying to do is get the best possible value from every transaction available. If you consistently do that, even if you don’t wind up with a star you are going to wind up with a lot of very good ball players and draft picks. However, if he had the opportunity to get 1 or more stars for all these pieces and picks, I think he would jump at the chance.
Daniel
February 4, 2011
It’s very hard to acquire a superstar in the NBA. Morey has done a fantastic job of acquiring above-average players, though letting McGrady play for the minimum for another team was a poor decision.
He also sold high on Carl Landry, who has been awful in Sactown.
Devin
February 4, 2011
Very interesting…I’ve been working on a post about the top three players on championship teams, and this post is relevant to that, specifically “from 1977-78 to 2009-10, the top three producers of wins on each team has produced – on average – 76% of their respective team’s total Wins Produced.”
Adam C. Madison
February 7, 2011
imo you need to ask better questions. WP is a great tool but you tackle boring situations with it.
Greg Dickenson
February 7, 2011
Great, great post. I have three observations:
(1) Prior to Morey as a GM, Carol Dawson over paid players who filled a niche, but were one-dimensional. (Matt Maloney and Calvin Cato come to mind.) (2) Morey began working for the Rockets before he was GM. I agree that Morey is prone to creating an “injury resistant” team because individual players that stay health is probably a factor in the players he picks. (3) Morey has a lot of assests, and it is likey that he will trade many of them for a high producing individual. He can see that a group of well performing role players will not win a championship.